This document is a memorandum for the 40 Committee, originally created on August 31, 1970. The subject line is “Options in Chilean Presidential Election During the Congressional Run-Off Phase (5 September–24 October 1970)”. It takes a speculative look at the possible outcomes of the election, focusing on a plurality occurring, which was seeming likely at that time.
This document highlights the complexity of the US plan, having much more nuance than just the main goal of preventing an Allende victory, and shows that covert action was also being considered for scenarios where Allende was the runner up, which displays either disrespect or the outright ignoring of the strength of the Chilean democrat excerpt. The end also displays that a decision had not been made about influencing the Chilean Congress yet, days before the election.
“3. Possible Electoral Situations and Options
a. The electoral situations which may require some type of action to deny the presidency to Allende in a congressional run-off and possible courses of action follow:
(1) Alessandri in first place over Allende by less than 100,000 votes:
(a) Possible options:
1 Take no action. This posture stresses the USG’s respect for the principle of self-determination and implies the conclusion that there is no satisfactory alternative to accepting a Marxist government in this hemisphere if it is constitutionally elected.
2 Take limited action. This alternative would allow for the continuation of the present anti-Allende propaganda campaign or direct political action to influence the outcome of the congressional vote, or a combination of the two. In either case the action could be taken through the cooperation of [26 lines redacted].
3 Broad action. This action would include steps described in 2 above in tandem with other [less than 1 line redacted] assets in the Democratic Radical Party, the National Party and possibly [less than 1 line redacted] contacts in the military. This broader approach would provide wider access to the Congress, but without measurably increasing leverage on it. In this case the U.S. would have to fund, direct and coordinate the efforts of the assets involved, thereby increasing the risk of exposure.
(2) Allende in first place over Alessandri. In this situation, the above options may also be considered. This situation offers the least chance of success and Alessandri has said he will not accept the presidency unless he finishes first in the popular vote. In addition, any action by the U.S. Government at the Washington level might also be desirable in order to encourage key world leaders to adopt a position which would influence the congressional vote against Allende.
(3) Allende in first place over Tomic . This situation is unlikely to occur, but if it does the same options as in 2 and 3 above might also be considered. Although the chances of denying Allende the presidency are slim, they would be better than in situation (2) above because of PDC strength in the Congress and the possibility that Alessandri supporters would vote for Tomic.
b. The following electoral situations might not require any action:
(1) Alessandri in first place over Allende by more than 100,000 votes. Although there is no guarantee that Congress would select Alessandri over Allende no matter what his margin of victory might be, informed estimates place a high probability on Alessandri being elected under these circumstances.
(2) Tomic in first place over Allende by any number of votes. The assumption in this situation is that Tomic would receive all of the congressional votes of the PDC and enough of those of the National Party to give him more than the required majority. Again, there is no absolute guarantee that this would take place.
(3) Alessandri in first place over Tomic and vice-versa. In this situation, Allende would not be a contender in the congressional run-off.
4. Implementation
a. In any of the action situations outlined above, the continuance of the propaganda instrumentalities could be used to:
(1) stimulate public opinion in such a way that it would bring pressure to bear on Congress not to vote for Allende, and,
(2) encourage a political climate in which a majority of Chileans would approve the selection of either Alessandri or Tomic if Allende is in first place.
b. The propaganda effort would include, but not necessarily be limited to extensive use of radio; publication of brochures, pamphlets, magazines, etc., depicting life under a Marxist regime, discussing Communist Party policies, and expanding upon themes put forth in the program of the UP and on statements made by UP leaders; replaying in the Chilean press of pertinent news stories of revelations which might originate outside Chile; publicizing pertinent quotes by prominent Chilean congressmen; sponsoring speeches by exiles from Communist bloc countries; sponsoring public appearances by prominent Chilean congressmen; and, sponsoring women and youth organizations so that they may exert grass-root pressure on Congress.
…
e. The [less than 1 line not declassified] which might be used to try to influence the Chilean Congress include [name not declassified] whose activities in attempting [less than 1 line not declassified] were approved by the 40 Committee; [less than 1 line not declassified] members of the National Party and [less than 1 line not declassified] senior officers in the Chilean military. The use of any of the above [less than 1 line not declassified] is limited to the extent that they can only try to influence those congressmen whom they may know. The military contacts also might issue tailored statements which would intimate that the military might not allow Allende to assume the presidency if chosen by the Congress.
5. Risks
a. The slightest revelation that the U.S. Government is involved in a political action operation against the Chilean Congress could mean almost certain victory for Allende, while at the same time seriously affecting the credibility of the U.S. Government in world affairs.
b. The risks involved in the continuation of the propaganda activity would be minimal, since only [less than 1 line not declassified] mechanisms would be used, and it would be a continuation of the anti-Allende activity.
c. The risks to the U.S. Government would be somewhat higher if [8 lines not declassified].
d. The possibility of security problems would be significantly increased if other covert assets were used; however, these are trusted people and their use, especially with Allende in first place, might justify the risks involved.
e. If Alessandri receives at least 100,000 votes more than Allende, then the chances of success in persuading the Congress to elect Alessandri are good, and there is a good chance that the operation could be carried out without the U.S. hand showing. However, with Allende in first place by whatever margin over either of the other candidates, the chances of denying the presidency to Allende are unfavorable, and the risk factors would necessarily increase as a result of a more hostile operational environment.
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7. Issues
a. It is requested that the Committee address itself to the following issues:
(1) Should the propaganda activities be continued into the congressional run-off period and, if so, under what precise circumstances?
(2) Is political action to be initiated to try to influence the Chilean Congress during the run-off period and, if so, under what precise situations?
(3) If political action is to be initiated, what should be its extent, i.e., limited or broad?
(4) Is direct contact with Chileans authorized to obtain the political intelligence required to plan and to implement a political action program?”
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-16, Documents on Chile, 1969-1973, eds. James McElveen and James Siekmeier. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 16. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/d16
