This document discusses the objectives of US foreign policy in Latin America as of May 28, 1958, outlined by six objectives designed to optimize the relationship between countries in the region and the United States. As mentioned in the contextual essay, the Operations Coordinating Board was tasked by Dwight D. Eisenhower with performing executive oversight of covert operations, and this document is an example of the kind of bureaucratic work involved.
The objectives listed here help set a baseline for what covert activities prioritized at the the start of the 12 year period that is being studied, which can be compared with later documents to demonstrate similarities and differences. For example, 2a., “Principle of Non-intervention” reflects a claimed quality that could not be claimed as early as the beginning of the next election cycle in Chile. It is also outright hypocritical given that the Operations Coordinating Board is had direct involvement in the 1954 coup against Arbenz in Guatemala.
“OPERATIONS PLAN FOR LATIN AMERICA
I. Introduction
A. Special Operating Guidance
1. Objectives:
a. Keep the other American Republics friendly toward the United States and retain their support of our world policies.
b. Encourage the development of stable political systems along democratic, representative lines.
c. Encourage the growth of sturdy, self-reliant economies based upon the free enterprise system.
d. Destroy or neutralize Soviet bloc and Communist influence in the area.
e. Obtain adequate production of and access to materials essential to our security.
f. Obtain the participation in and support of measures to defend the hemisphere.
2. In implementing our policies and seeking our objectives in Latin America, emphasis should be placed on the following principles and programs:
a. Principle of Non-intervention. This principle, proscribing intervention by the United States Government unilaterally in the internal affairs of the other American republics, is the cornerstone of our inter-American relations. It is a principle based on the cardinal U.S. policy for self-determination of peoples. It does not preclude multilateral action through the Organization of American States (OAS) against a government of the hemisphere. The concept that the United States attempts to maintain friendly relations with the governments of all the other American republics without implying approbation or disapprobation of the domestic policies of those governments should be developed and publicized. There should be increased efforts to convince the governments and peoples of the democracies that U.S. action or discrimination against the dictatorships would be the very type of intervention they themselves so vigorously decry, and could often have an effect the opposite of what was intended. Nevertheless, while making clear our position of non-intervention in the internal developments of the Latin American countries, we should express our satisfaction and pleasure when the people of any country determinedly choose the road of democracy and freedom.
b. Principle of Individual and Collective Aid. This principle is based on solemn inter-American treaties and agreements, particularly the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolutions, which establish that an attack against one state is an attack against all and provide for individual or collective (OAS) aid to any one of the 21 republics against intervention, attack or communist subversion.
c. Elimination of Soviet Bloc and Communist Intervention. A continuous program to achieve this objective is consistent with the provisions of Article 93 of the Caracas Conference Resolutions. It is of particular importance as the Soviets and communists increase their activities and seek to extend their influence in this hemisphere. The Latin American governments and peoples should be more fully informed and made aware of the use to which the Soviet Union and its satellites put their diplomatic, military, trade and other missions for purposes of subversion, intervention and direction of local communist activities.
d. Development of Internal Security Programs. The absolute strength of Latin American communist parties is not impressive at the present time. However, factors such as unstable political systems, ultra-nationalist sentiment, inadequate internal security forces, poverty and unstable economic conditions, are susceptible to exploitation by the communists. The United States should assist in strengthening the internal security forces in selected countries. In so doing, care should be taken to avoid creating the impression that the United States has abandoned the principle of non-intervention or has committed itself to the preservation of the status quo through repression of the non-communist political opposition. In the development of Overseas Internal Security Programs requiring the assignment of police technicians to the field, the basic anti-communist objective of the program must be strictly observed. Specific OISP programs for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala have been designated Annex A to this Operations Plan.5
e. Encouragement of Private Enterprise. Every opportunity should be taken to encourage the expansion or adoption of a system of free enterprise in the area. Without in any way attempting to impose our own methods, increased efforts should be made to explain adequately the benefits to be gained from this system. Achievements of free enterprise in the United States, in Latin America and elsewhere should be increasingly emphasized and publicized. The decision of certain governments to create state monopolies, particularly in the oil industry, has hampered their economic growth and development.
f. Labor. Constant attention should be given to encouraging in the area strong, free trade union movements capable of effective collective bargaining, as a bulwark against communism and totalitarianism as a factor in the free enterprise system, and as a force for political stability and economic development.
g. Encouragement of Economic Development. Each of the other republics should be encouraged to do all in its own power to set its house in order for economic development (especially through adoption of sound monetary and fiscal policies, utilization of free private enterprise, and maintenance of freedom from Soviet bloc or communist influence). Without committing the United States, the belief should be promoted within recipient governments that continued cooperation and assistance from the United States depend in part on their willingness and ability to cooperate with us in achieving common objectives. The maintenance of a genuine and effective anti-communist policy, and the requisite self-discipline to withstand those hardships which may be necessary to achieve greater economic vigor and stability are important in this regard.
h. Encouragement of Trade Expansion. Encouragement should be given throughout the area to trade expansion, and the reduction or elimination of barriers to such expansion.”
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V, General United States Policy Towards Latin America, eds. N. Stephen Kane and Paul Claussen (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), Document 3. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d3
