This document is from William Belton in the American Embassy in Chile to the Department of State, which was headed by Secretary of State Christian Herter at the time. The document was created on May 20, 1958, and has the subject line “U.S. Policy towards Chile”. It provides a run down of not only how, from observations, Chileans are reacting to United States policy, but also what the implications of the information are. It also discusses what can be done to improve what is being considered a relatively stable relationship with some minor issues. It reflects that Belton is an outsider looking in, this document isn’t being written by a Chilean citizen. If it was, or it was a proper poll, detail not present here could be possible.
This document is very significant. It establishes a baseline for this project in a sense. This is the earliest document in the project and its whole purpose is to establish Chile’s current view of the United States and its relationship with them. When thinking about the progression of the polarization that occurs over the next 12 years, thinking about what has changed and what has stayed the same compared to this document may be helpful.
“Despatch from the Charge in Chile (Belton) to the Department of State
Santiago, May 20, 1958
Subject: U.S. Policy Towards Chile
…The Embassy believes Chilean views are of particular interest because the Chilean free press, combined with Chile’s traditionally democratic governmental processes and outlook, provide a better basis for local understanding of the U.S. than is available in almost any other country south of the border
Much criticism of U.S. Policy has recently developed here. It gradually rose above what might be called the normal level as the Chilean economic situation deteriorated due to low copper prices. It reached flood stage with the Department of Interior press release of April 11 on copper tariffs, and it overflowed on all sides as evidence of criticism in other South American countries accumulated with the progress of the Vice President’s [Richard Nixon] trip.
In considering this problem, the Embassy believes it important to bear in mind that a basically friendly feeling toward the U.S. exists among the majority of Chileans. Much of the criticism, and certainly the most constructive aspect of it, comes from people who recognize, accept, and want a continuation of the U.S. as the predominant foreign influence in this country. It is also highly important to remember that Chileans are adept in seeing the mote in our eye and not the beam ini their own, and that the missing elements for which they criticize us are often missing because of our conditioning their supply on Chilean performance, which has been faulty. Nonetheless, if we want Chile to be a strong and friendly ally, we may have to accept certain Chilean failings and find ways to pursue our policy in spit of them, rather than slow down or halt our help while waiting for Chileans to change character.
U.S.-Latin America policy, while recognized as basically sound and accepted as helpful b y most Chileans, has nevertheless exhausted its overt appeal here…
Specific Complaints
Major Chilean complaints boil down to the following:
1) U.S. Resistance against commodity arrangements to guarantee reasonable copper prices, while keeping presumed Soviet bloc demand ineffective, leaving Chile, so extremely dependent on foreign trade in copper, to shoulder a cold war burden re this strategic commodity far beyond its capacity.
2) U.S Tendence to revert to protectionism at the expense of its friends in the face of what to Chile appears relatively minor domestic economic problems, thus forgetting our position and obligations as the leading world power.
3) Failure of the U.S. –or of international financial agencies which the U.S. could apparently influence heavily—in spite of declared intentions to the contrary, to provide development capital sufficient to enable Chilean to progress enough to keep up with growth rates elsewhere and especially in the U.S., not to mention reducing the vast distance between our standards of living
4) Failure of the U.S. to distinguish within the hemisphere between truly democratic friends such as Chile and dictatorships.
5) Apparent use by U.S. of expediency rather than policy in granting aid throughout the world, waiting until things are in a truly dangerous mess before coming to the rescue. Many Chileans feel that a serious Communist menace close at hand is the best guarantee of U.S. support, irrespective of the virtues of the recipient.
The embassy would add the flowing additional factors which it believes have an appreciable effect on attitudes here, even though they have not recently been given special publicity…
6) The U.S., still the world’s most liberal and democratic country, has let itself be forced into an appearance of economic and political conservatism. Such a posture has no appeal to the average Latin, who is excited by notions and dramatic examples of idealism…
7) Our policy toward cultural and non-strategic trade contact between Chileans and the Soviet bloc gives an impression of blind fear which harms us and has had no productive results to our knowledge. In most instances it is more rigid than our policy for U.S.-Soviet contacts, and it does not jibe with our own standards of intellectual freedom and freedom of inquiry and of commerce. We have not lived down the harm McCarthyism did us here and will not until we relax and let the Chileans know we recognize they are as politically sophisticated as we are. When we do, our approaches on problems of strategic trade and other Communist contacts of similar significance will carry far more weight.
8) Chileans are not convinced that the use of force to accomplish our objectives has been completely discarded. They are convinced we intervened in Guatemala [see: 1954 Guatemalan Coup], and they view the serious concern the recent sending of paratroopers toward Venezuela. They worry that if they do not get enough development assistance to raise their standard of living appreciably, Communism will get a firm foothold and the U.S. against its will and principle, will have to intervene by force, starting the era of Pax Romana al la U.S.A.
…
12) Chileans, as a people, undoubtedly know us, as a people, better than we known them. Everything, including our world position, position, movies, press wire services, USIA [United States Information Agency], make that inevitable. Yet they understand us poorly. That being the case, how can we expect to understand them well. They have none of our means to bring themselves to our attention. Our ignorance of them is abysmal. Our lack of interest is almost as great. They know this and it offends them.
Some Suggestions…
7) Demonstrate that we do recognize the difference between a Dominican dictatorship and a Chilean democracy. We have already proved that giving the cold shoulder to the dictators is not the ideal way. Continue to treat them courteously and with sufficient cordiality to guarantee their cooperation where this is essential. Reflect the differences we recognize and feel by doing extra things for the true democracies. Wrap up some nice packages, some cultural, some financial, some political, but all of a type providing mutual benefits. Present them to democracies, letting it be known we are doing so because they are democratic.”
Despatch from the Charge in Chile (Belton) to the Department of State, May 20, 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Volume V, American Republics Supplement, Microfiche, Andrews Library, College of Wooster.
